Lebanon is one of the countries targeted by Israel and the U.S. in the Middle East. Israel continues to occupy the southern part of the country, demolishing homes and rendering villages uninhabitable. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government, in cooperation with the United States, is conducting negotiations with Israel to disarm Hezbollah, the country's only armed force fighting against the Israeli occupation. The negotiation process hasn't even stopped the Israeli attacks. The Israeli military is continuing its attacks, particularly in the south. Finally, on Saturday, Israeli warplanes bombed various areas, and at least 11 more Lebanese were killed. This figure is in addition to the 4,335 Lebanese who have lost their lives since March 2, when Israel resumed its intense attacks.
We spoke with Lebanese author and translator Alain Alameddine about Lebanon's negotiation process with Israel and the structural problems in Lebanese politics. Alain, who serves as a coordinator for the One Democratic State Initiative and is also a supporter of the "Citizens in the State" (MMFD) political party in Lebanon, emphasized that Lebanon agreeing that Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon would hedge on conditions that Lebanon should meet is unacceptable. He said, "In my view, there are two issues. First, the occupation; second, the government that endorses and legitimizes the occupation." He pointed out that Lebanon's sectarian political system laid the groundwork for the situation we see today and added that "Israel's most powerful weapon against Lebanon is not bombs, but using identity to fragment us. We give the thief the key to our house, and then we complain and wonder how the thief got in?"
"In Lebanon, the state exists in name only; power lies in the hands of sectarian leaders" — You left Lebanon a short while ago. What was the general situation like before you left the country?
Lebanon has been embroiled in a war of varying intensity for three years. In southern Lebanon, which is under Israeli occupation, destruction occurs every day, and people are killed several times a week. There is internal forced migration. There are 40 villages that have been completely destroyed. There is no one left in these villages. There are also many villages that haven't yet been completely destroyed but have been abandoned by their residents. The number of migrants is in the hundreds of thousands. People displaced by the war are viewed in the places they go as "Shiites coming to our Christians, Sunnis, or Druze region." In fact, some have even started speaking of "demographic change," as if the migrants were a different kind of people.
How have Israel's attacks and occupation reshaped politics in Lebanon? So, I think it's important to clarify the original political situation in Lebanon: Here, there is something called the "state" as a concept. In name, there is a state, a parliament, a judiciary, laws, etc. In practice, however, real power lies in the hands of the former warlords—who are also sectarian leaders—and the leaders of the civil war. Consequently, decisions are made not at the government level but, in fact, at the sectarian level.
And the government is just a façade. If the leaders of the sects reach an agreement on an issue, their representatives also vote to approve it. That's the situation in Lebanon. To give an example, let's look at the negotiations with Israel. A few years ago, we held negotiations regarding the border between Lebanon and Israel, and these negotiations were conducted not by the foreign minister, but by the speaker of the parliament—not because he has the legitimacy to do so from the state's perspective, but because he is a sect leader. Therefore, the real power and authority lie with the sects.
Consequently, the situation in the country is causing tensions between the different sects; for they view this not as Israel declaring war on the entire society, but as the Shiites initiating a war against Israel.
"Making Israel's withdrawal conditional is unacceptable" — Lebanon's new government is conducting some negotiations with Israel. Seven meetings have been held so far. What are your thoughts on the content and progress of these negotiations?
The idea of negotiating with Israel, in my view, does not pose a problem in and of itself. After all, even with enemies, negotiations take place. I don't think most Lebanese political parties and citizens have a problem with this concept either. But the real question is: What are we negotiating? What are the terms and conditions? In my view, the purpose of the negotiations should not be to normalize relations with Israel or to recognize it as a legitimate state, but rather to secure a ceasefire in order to ensure Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and the release of prisoners. The problem is that the Lebanese people were not told in advance what would be negotiated. As a result, the agreed-upon agreement—known as a framework agreement—was adopted.
There are several unacceptable conditions. One of these is that Israel's withdrawal is conditional. This is subject to two conditions. First, Lebanon must disarm Hezbollah. Second, there is a call for a security agreement that Israel would accept. Both are problematic because a withdrawal cannot be conditional. If we, as Lebanese, want to disarm Hezbollah, that is an internal matter for Lebanon. This cannot be a condition set by Israel. So, in my opinion, there are two problems. First, the occupation; second, the government that endorses and legitimizes the occupation.
The framework agreement also calls for a confrontation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah. Today, the Lebanese army is funded by Qatar and the United States. In fact, it should be financed from Lebanon's own resources, particularly from the banking and rentier sectors. That has never been done. In my opinion, the army's capabilities should be strengthened to the point where it no longer needs Hezbollah. And this is the direction we must take—including making Hezbollah accept this. However, this cannot be achieved by means of confrontation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah. In the framework agreement, Lebanon agrees to confront Hezbollah. In short, what we're saying to Israel is: "You don't need to fight Hezbollah—we'll do that for you." So this is a terrible deal.
Another point that is completely unacceptable is Lebanon's agreement not to fight against Israel on the international political stage. Where is Lebanon's sovereignty? And if we say, "We will not use any weapons against you," how can we expect Israel to withdraw? In other words, in the agreement, we are essentially telling Israel the following: "We will not use our weapons to fight you, we will not prosecute you in court, and we will not use our international relations against you. But if you don't mind, please withdraw. "
"The process of normalization began in 2001 when Lebanon recognized Israel as a state" — So why did the Lebanese government choose this path? Why did he choose to negotiate these contentious issues with Israel in this way and accept the conditions set by Israel and the United States?
There are several reasons for this. First of all, this isn't a new situation. This is a new phase of an old trend. For example, ever since the establishment of the colony in Palestine in 1948, Israel has repeatedly stated its intention to invade Lebanon and provoke an identity-based civil war there. Even before the colony was established—the World Zionist Organization used to say the same. However, Lebanon had never remained silent in the face of a threat. Even when Lebanon was occupied in the '70s, '80s, and '90s, the Lebanese people resisted; various groups resisted. We liberated Beirut and nearly all of southern Lebanon. This situation continued until the year 2000. But in 2001, Lebanon announced that it was prepared to recognize Israel as a legitimate state. As you can see, this is an old process. This isn't a new situation that has arisen with this government. In 2006, the Lebanese resistance scored yet another military victory against Israel. However, the UN resolutions that Lebanon adopted were also in Israel's favor. Consequently, we are talking about military victories and political defeats.
Since then, Lebanon has pursued a series of policies that have benefited Israel. This is a defeat. There was mandatory military service in Lebanon. We removed it. If we take Israel seriously as an enemy, we must be able to defend ourselves. I'm not saying this because I love military service, but because there is a real and ruthless enemy out there. In addition, policies were implemented that weakened Lebanon. For example, we don't have a productive economy, and most of our young workforce is outside Lebanon. In other words, this does not create the societal capacity to confront any enemy. Lebanon still uses a colonial-era curriculum in its education system. There is the Lebanese curriculum, and there is also the French curriculum, which states that Israel is a legitimate state. Why do we accept this?
We have adopted many policies that weakened Lebanon. First and foremost, when there is an enemy—and a powerful one at that—it is normal for society to become divided. So, if someone comes and attacks us, maybe you'll fight, and I'll run away. This might be normal. Therefore, when faced with someone who has committed genocide in Gaza and continues to do so, one possible reaction—and I'm not saying this is a good reaction, nor am I making a moral judgment, but it is a natural reaction—is this: "All right, they're that powerful—let's just live in peace; if they want to impose their terms, let's accept them—it's better than genocide." But I don't agree with the idea that there are only two options—that is, the idea of "either genocide or normalization."
Another reason why Lebanon is going through normalization is capitalism. In Lebanon, as in most colonized countries, our capitalists do not rely on local production; they resell goods produced in other countries. For example, the clothes I wore in Lebanon were purchased in Turkey. Our cars are Japanese, our phones are made in Korea, and so on—our clothes are made in Turkey. For Lebanese capitalists, buying and reselling goods is less risky than setting up a factory and dealing with all the problems that would entail. Consequently, the capitalist class in Lebanon relies on good international relations and does not care about sovereignty. All they care about is making a profit, and in their view, it's better not to resist and to treat the situation as normal. This means greater stability and more foreign investment for them.
There are 24 ministers in this government; 11 of them are bankers—nearly half. And one of the key bankers, named Sehnaoui, is also taking part in the negotiations. A U.S. official had described him as a "Christian Zionist." I don't know if he's Christian, but he's definitely a Zionist. Here are a number of reasons why society is divided on this issue.
"The causes of the civil war in Lebanon have never been eliminated." — If the government were to take steps toward disarmament, are you afraid that a new civil war might break out in Lebanon? Hezbollah appears to be the only resistance force in Lebanon at the moment and also has a social base in the country.
Am I afraid that a civil war will break out? Yes. We have already experienced two civil wars in Lebanon, and we have never addressed the root causes of civil war. Civil wars do not break out spontaneously. They are incited by foreign or local forces.
I'll give you an example. One of the places that brings the community together is the university. In Arabic, it is "jaamea," which means "to bring together." A public university can be a great thing for the community because it brings people together. People from rural areas—where a town typically belongs to a single religion—come together in the "jaamea" there, get to know one another, and grow accustomed to each other. They engage in social and political discussions, fall in love, get married. So what happened? They shut down the university during the civil war and decentralized. For example, law school was moved to an area with a majority of Christians and engineering school was moved to an area with a majority of Muslims. This led to a situation where most lawyers were Christian and most engineers were Muslim. Consequently, the bar association is predominantly Christian with a Christian head, while the engineers' association is predominantly Muslim with a Muslim hear. This is a terrible situation. It is a new phase in the process of removing politics from the unions. We haven't changed this situation at all.
Therefore, the root of the civil war is always there. And when it comes to Israel, the situation gets even worse. Israel's most powerful weapon against Lebanon is not bombs, but identity; it politicizes identity and uses it as a weapon.
For example, Netanyahu delivered a speech addressing the Lebanese people in 2024. "Dear Christians, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze of Lebanon," he said. In other words, he addressed us by category. A few months ago, I also said, "Many people in Lebanon want me to disarm Hezbollah and free Lebanon from Hezbollah. Many Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and even many Shiites told me they wanted me to do this," he said. In other words, it's conditioning us to see ourselves as sects.
Indeed, the leaders—including Hezbollah—are sectarian leaders. In other words, we're playing into the enemy's hands. We give the thief the key to our house, and then we complain and ask, "How did the thief get in?"
"Those who oppose the agreement with Israel also support the continuation of this status quo" — Do you see any social movement or unrest that could change the course of events in Lebanon?
There are social movements, but no, unfortunately, they aren't in a position to bring about change. For example, there were a few sectarian parties that rejected the framework agreement I just mentioned. However, these parties, including Hezbollah, are represented in the government. They did not withdraw from it. Actually, this government's term was supposed to end six months ago according to the law. Elections had to be held to form a new parliament and, consequently, a new government. If the elections took place as they should, the government would not have been able to sign this agreement. However, the same forces criticizing the framework agreement as unacceptable they chose to renew the parliament without holding an election. This automatically reinstated the government.
The party I support in Lebanon—namely, "Citizens in the State" (MMFD)—has proposed several steps that need to be taken. This was included in an open letter addressed to Hezbollah and other leaders. "If you view Iran as a model," they said, "consider it was able to stand firm because it is a state." Iran has an economy and a social structure. There is much to criticize about Iran, but a state has been established. And we, too, should pursue similar policies in Lebanon. So they said, "If you love Iran, act like Iran."
There are banks in Lebanon that are robbing us. We have a massive demographic problem stemming from the fact that all Lebanese have left the country. We have an enemy right at our doorstep. We are facing a sectarian divide. These are the challenges facing all Lebanese people. Therefore, the need for a state in Lebanon exists precisely to address these issues. This is how we'll stand up to Israel, too—with a program for how to resist it.
We proposed three main policies at all the levels I mentioned. First, to rebuild the military and public service; second, to secure funding for the army from Lebanon; and third, to assert the legitimacy of a civil state in which people are not automatically born into a particular sect. There was some public debate, but it was minimal. And no alternative was proposed. The opposition movement has not adopted a political platform either. "We reject the framework agreement," they say. But simply rejecting it isn't enough; an alternative is needed.
What needs to be done is to put pressure on the opposition to get them to adopt an alternative. Then we can organize not just around what we reject, but also around what we want.
Finally, I'd like to ask about the situation of the working class in Lebanon. Who makes up the workforce in Lebanon? What is their social and political situation?
Most of the workforce in Lebanon is not Lebanese. Mostly Syrian refugees; there are also Palestinians and people of other nationalities, such as Ethiopians, Sri Lankans, Indians, and Bengalis. And these people are generally completely ignored by left-wing parties—that seek to be elected to parliament—because they do not vote. If you don't work with the working class, what kind of leftists can you possibly be?
There are many Syrians in Lebanon, and Lebanese people are leaving the country today; I think there are more Syrians under the age of four than there are Lebanese. This means that within 15 years, the majority of the workforce will not be Lebanese. I don't have a problem with that; I'm not saying this from a right-wing perspective or as if it were a problem. But this is a massive demographic shift that we need to manage.
For example, we need to consider the following questions: Who are these Syrians, where do they live, what is their level of education, what skills do they have, and what is their professional experience? Are they married? Do they have any health issues? We need to know these things because this is our society. We don't even have a census for the Lebanese. In other words, left-wing parties place importance on elections, but they don't talk about managing this demographic shift. One of the solutions MMFD is working on in this area is worker cooperatives. We don't need capitalists. Almost no one is working on this. In other words, solutions do exist, but there is a lack of political will to understand the workforce and address this issue from an economic, productive, and political perspective.
