The past months were extremely hard for the Iranian people. Popular protests were met with extreme repression, a fact the Iranian president recognized and expressed "shame" for. At the same time, it suffered from foreign aggression at the hand of the colony and the United States.
Many voices focused on one of those two aggressions, downplaying the other. Is it true, however, that Iranian society must choose between one freedom and another? Alain Alameddine, a coordinator at the One Democratic State Initiative, interviewed four members of the Iranian "Tanide" collective, who recently published a "No to War" statement that expressed a third path for true liberation and democracy. The full text of the interview follows. A shortened version can be found on The De-Colonial Horizon.
1- How are things in Iran? What is the media not reporting? The authorities blocked Internet access during its repression of the protests before, is it still the case? How is this affecting what we're seeing? What do you think the world should know?
B.R:
A further dimension of the current information climate about Iran is the contraction of people's access to more diverse and more reliable news sources due to the internet shutdown. They are consequently confined to two highly polarized media narratives. On the one hand, the state-controlled media within Iran broadcast propaganda- especially narratives glorifying the state's military strength, and threatening messages against any form of opposition and dissent.
At the same time, many Iranians rely on satellite channels such as Iran International, which are closely aligned with U.S.–Israeli political interests. These channels often present highly misleading narratives, for example, mistranslating Trump's "return Iran to the Stone Age" as "return the Islamic Republic to the Stone Age." (This example shows how these media channels can shape narratives in ways that obscure implications of bombing of Iran for the ordinary people). As a result, Iranians are kept in an information bubble while the real human cost of the war remains hidden, because the blackout prevents documentation and journalists cannot report safely.
Consequently, both domestic and international audiences remain partially or wholly unaware of the full extent of civilian suffering.
H.V:
It is always complicated to speak about Iran from the diaspora. One is positioned at a distance, receiving fragments, images, messages, silences, filtered through media infrastructures, state censorship, and personal networks. What we feel and think is inevitably mediated, partial, and uneven. This does not mean it is false, but it does mean it must be held with caution.
From what can be gathered through conversations with friends and family, especially those who have managed to maintain some form of internet access, often through paid VPN configurations, there is a sense that conditions are intensifying rather than stabilizing. At the same time, access itself has become stratified: the ability to remain connected is increasingly tied to economic privilege, which already shapes what can be seen and shared.
The question of internet shutdowns remains central. Iran has repeatedly used network disruptions as a tool of control, especially during moments of protest and unrest. While the level of restriction fluctuates, the infrastructure of limitation is still very much in place. This directly affects what the outside world can witness: what circulates internationally is never the full picture, but a delayed, filtered, and often decontextualized version of events.
What is often underreported is the entanglement of internal and external pressures. The situation cannot be reduced either to domestic repression alone or to external geopolitical aggression alone. Internal unrest, shaped by economic crisis, inflation, sanctions, and political repression, intersects with ongoing tensions with global powers. Sanctions and monetary instability have deeply affected everyday life, including the ability to secure basic economic stability. At the same time, external military or strategic pressures are frequently framed as solutions or interventions, but in practice, they tend to intensify precarity for ordinary people.
Civilian populations bear the consequences, through displacement, fear, and further economic collapse, while political narratives simplify the situation into binaries that do not reflect lived realities.
It is also important to resist the idea that removing leadership alone would fundamentally transform the system. The political structure in Iran is not reducible to a few individuals; it is sustained through complex institutional, ideological, and military networks. Any claim that regime change can be achieved through targeted interventions alone overlooks these material and structural conditions.
What the world should understand is this: the reality inside Iran is not fully visible, not fully communicable, and not easily simplified. People are living within overlapping pressures: state control, economic hardship, and geopolitical conflict. And much of what circulates globally captures only fragments of this reality, often shaped by the very forces that are involved in it.
D.F:
The internet access is still massively blocked. The VPN configurations are in general disproportionately expensive and many cannot afford them. In this sense even an unstable sporadic internet connection depends on social class and also on the human network one might have. Since there is also a limited opportunity for compatriots in diaspora to provide individuals in Iran with paid VPN. All in all many are in complete blackout, which means we do not know how they are doing, they cannot give any account of their situation or express their feelings and their wishes, and surely they cannot get alarmed or be informed in time about the bombardments.
Many people have lost their jobs, since many jobs require direct access to the internet. Among those are also many in precarious labour conditions. The effects of internet blackout on losing jobs alongside with the general effect of war on losing purchasing power due to increasing prices are probably still not so manifest everywhere and for everyone, however passing time the economical pressure would reveal itself as a much more destructive force.
N.A:
The situation in Iran, at least as far as I understand it, is multilayered. The country continues to function without major disruption, particularly in terms of providing basic needs and services, which many find reassuring. At the same time, seeing Iran capable of defending its sovereignty in the face of foreign, imperialist aggression is a source of reassurance and stability for many. However, for those who may have seen this moment as their only chance to overthrow the regime, the current situation is deeply disappointing. Overall, feelings and opinions remain in flux, shaped by a highly fragile context both regionally and globally.
Another important aspect is the memory of the most recent crackdown on protests across Iran — with death toll exceeding thousands, according to the official reports — which remains an open wound. Iranian society has lived through repeated waves of uprisings, repression, massacres, executions, and devastating inflation. These experiences cannot be reduced to a single explanatory frame, such as imperialist aggression as well as sanctions, even though many foreign commentators and activists tend to do so.
In fact, this kind of "bigger picture" analysis — one that reduces societies to geopolitical forces — often renders the lived realities, struggles, and suffering of Iranians invisible. This erasure is further intensified by the misrepresentation of Iranian society under the narrow and highly visible banner of far-right, pro-monarchist, pro-Zionist opposition group.
The internet blackout, however, is something that must be taken very seriously. Even after the ceasefire, it remains in place. But this is not the only issue. I see this moment as marking an irreversible shift — a move toward the total securitization of communication across the country, one that may persist for an unknown period. Moreover, a black market for VPNs has already emerged, with exorbitant prices, effectively turning internet access into a privilege reserved for the upper classes. At the same time, new regulations are being introduced that restrict access for the majority while granting it to specific groups and individuals.
This is deeply troubling. It not only exacerbates existing inequalities but also enables tighter control over the narrative surrounding Iran's internal dynamics and its relationship to the outside world. Ironically, those who justify these measures as necessary for national security are often the very ones who retain access to the global internet — and who, in turn, play a central role in shaping and circulating that narrative.
2- What do you think the U.S. and the colony's aims in Iran are? How has the aggression affected Iran? Has it changed people's perception of the regime, or their stance on it?
B.R:
Although the Islamic Republic had already lost substantial legitimacy among the general population, the war has reinforced cohesion among its remaining loyalists and strengthened the ideological narrative of the Axis of Resistance. This dynamic is consistent with the well‑established "rally‑around‑the‑flag" effect, in which external aggression temporarily consolidates support for the state among its core constituents, even if long‑term legitimacy remains deeply eroded.
D.F:
It could have been several goals and those of the U.S. do not entirely coincide with the aims of Israel. The US seems to be interested in dominating Iran's oil in the end, in a power game with China. At the same time it is backing Israel's agenda in the region. Israel seems to be interested in a very weak destabilised Iran which could be either divided or being embroiled in civil war. A regime change does not seem to be a main goal here. Though on the way to weaken Iran by controlling its nuclear ambitions, missile plans and regional power a regime change could also be desired.
N.A:
I see this aggression as operating on several interconnected levels. First, it can be understood as an escalation of the long-standing tension between Iran and the United States — from the movement to nationalize Iran's oil and the US-backed coup, to the 1979 revolution, the hostage crisis, and the prolonged tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear program.
But this framing is not sufficient on its own. It needs to be situated within broader regional and global dynamics: the United States' concerns over its declining global hegemony and its competition with China and Russia, as well as Israel's efforts to consolidate a regional coalition to secure its dominant position through its genocidal will.
At the same time, it is crucial not to overlook a wider pattern: this aggression is part of a broader authoritarian turn within global capitalism, alongside the rise of reactionary nationalisms across the world. I trace this trajectory through a series of recent moments — from the COVID pandemic to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, to the genocide in Gaza, and now its extension to Iran, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Not to forget, the siege of Kobani in northeastern Syria (Rojava), carried out under the leadership of Syria's unelected new authority, further illustrates how these dynamics are unfolding across the region.
Another way to periodize this conjuncture is by tracing the prolonged backlash against successive waves of popular uprisings across the region — from Iran (2009), to the Arab Spring, and beyond. The fact that all regional powers, including Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, have been actively implicated in this backlash should caution us against overlooking a key contradiction.
What is often neglected in anti-war discourse, particularly within progressive global media, is precisely this tension: while Iran is currently the target of illegal and aggressive attacks, and its right to defend itself must be recognized, it has not historically been a force for peace in the region. The state has repeatedly intervened in neighboring countries through its ties to militia groups, while also militarizing the notion of "resistance" within a state-centered framework.
It may be too soon to assess how this war will affect or shift people's understanding of the regime. I would prefer to revisit this question when people are able to communicate more freely. For now, what I observe are shifting and sometimes conflicting emotions. For those who had seen war as a possible opening to break from the regime, that possibility now appears increasingly unfeasible- I mean I hope so. At the same time, many are openly criticizing and shaming pro-Zionist media outlets and journalists for misleading the public. There is also a third position — one that has consistently opposed both war and the regime's oppressive nature, while insisting that people must determine their future through their own movements and collective action, and resist any normalization of foreign intervention.
Yet, as has often been the case, regime-affiliated media and accounts are now targeting this group of citizens and activists with particular intensity. So even if Iran appears militarily resilient or even victorious, its internal wounds and tensions remain unresolved.
3- Some claim that now is not the time to talk about the regime's oppression, as it justifies the invasion. How do you view this? What is the alternative to the "either with foreign aggression or with the Islamic Republic" dichotomy?
B.R:
The argument that "Talking about the Islamic Republic's oppression right now will justify the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran" is based on a false causal link.
The United States and Israel did not launch military attacks on Iran because the Iranian state is authoritarian or oppressive. Neither the USA nor Israel are interested in freedom! Therefore, discussing the Islamic Republic's repression cannot logically be interpreted as justifying a violation of international law by external actors. In other words, condemning state oppression is not the cause of foreign aggression, and cannot be used to retroactively legitimize it. This binary is itself a political tool. It is designed to eliminate the space for a third position: a position that rejects both authoritarianism and militarism of the Iranian state as well as USA and Israel imperialistic intervention; a position that stands against the human rights violations by both US.Israel (particularly the genocide of Palestinian people), and the Iranian state.
We must consistently reaffirm a fundamental principle of international law: the internal political character of a state—whether democratic or authoritarian, does not grant other states the right to use military force against the country.
D.F:
In my opinion we can never stop talking about the regime's oppression. The recent massacre was less than three months ago. The regime has never stopped repressing its own people. In each uprising there have been the worn-out narrative of spies, traitors and the so-called Al-Mufsid fi al-Arḍ accusations in the service of killing machine of the regime, dragging protestors behind the bars and then through show trials to the gallows. Alongside war the regime has been continuing executing political prisoners, among them some were arrested in the recent uprising in January 2026.
We may not forget that this war is not ours. The regime is not fighting on our name and its resistance is mainly to save its own illegitimate sovereignty which has been challenged several times during the past years in various uprisings. We should also not forget that this regime has also been a source of aggression in the region, even stretching its arms beyond the region giving hand to Russia in the war against Ukraine. And regarding the dichotomy I would say: Neither with foreign aggression nor with the Islamic Republic.
4- The Islamic Republic claims identitarian legitimacy, particularly the Waliy Al-Faqeeh school of Shiism, and also Persian. The colony has often spoken of using this to fragment Iran as they have in the rest of the region. Today this is explicitly being used. Do you feel this identitarian logic has weakened Iranian society, made it more susceptible to foreign infiltration?
D.F:
I would say yes. The Shi'a hegemony has been something real. A man of Shiite faith enjoys the best rights in the laws of Islamic Republic. Of course religion, language or ethnicity are not the only discrimination factors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation and identities is surely experienced most widely in the whole country. However the central state has played a different domination role especially in the border regions which are mainly populated by non-Persian people – by Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Balochs. Two populations among them are mainly Sunnis — namely Kurds and Balochs — and a small portion of the Arab population also believes in Sunni Islam. These non-Persian and partly non-Shiite populations experience different oppressions and multiple exclusions and marginalizations. They had for instance prohibitions on learning in their mother tongue at school, limitations regarding their own national values and histories. The main Persian-Shi'a discourse has been trying to dominate specific historical narratives and suppress the other identities.
However this is not just a discursive matter. At the same time there have been asymmetrical developments in some of those regions. Kurdistan and Balochistan i.a. are suffering more unemployment and especially in Balochistan the development of infrastructure is partly very poor. Another method of domination has also been the appointment of non-local people to the leading positions in those provinces, trying to exercise central power. All of this makes Iranian society more vulnerable to foreign interference.
N.A:
As far as I understand it, one of the central struggles within Iranian society has been to break from the narrative imposed by the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. This does not equate to opposing Islam or Shi'a identity; rather, as has been evident since the revolutionary moment of 1979 and in subsequent waves of resistance, the struggle has been against the political and institutional framework built around that doctrine.
This narrow framework has produced and sustained a privileged notion of a "normative identity" in Iran — one that is Shi'a, Persian, and male — a form of supremacy that has been consolidated not only through the constitution, but also across a range of social and cultural institutions that structure everyday life.
Since the 1990s, the slogan "Iran for all Iranians" helped galvanize the reform movement by articulating a more inclusive vision. Yet this momentum was quickly curtailed by backlash from hardline forces, and its transformative potential was significantly diminished.
Despite this, Iranian society — in all its ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, and social diversity — has continued to make its demands visible through multiple forms of resistance. However, these efforts have rarely translated into structural change at the judicial or constitutional level. Many of these demands continue to be met with severe repression, including detention, torture, and execution — practices that persist even amid war.
It is also important to note that Velayat-e Faqih is not only a religious or constitutional constraint; it also shapes the economic sphere, particularly through its close entanglement with military institutions such as the IRGC. This nexus is likely to intensify under current conditions, further consolidating monopolistic and opaque forms of power. This weakens society's capacity to protect itself from those wielding power, but also weakens it in the face of external danger.
5- What future do you envision for Iranian society? How can Iranian society both within their country and outside it shape that future? How can those who support freedom and democracy for Iran help achieve it?
N.A:
In the short — and even medium — term, I unfortunately do not see any meaningful progress on the horizon in terms of Iran's capacity to overcome its internal divisions and tensions. What I do see, instead, is an intensification of repression, evident in the ongoing executions.
At the same time, Iranian civil society appears to be in one of its weakest positions since 1988, in the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq war and the mass execution of political prisoners. The channels that once allowed for some degree of mediation or navigation within the political landscape have largely disappeared.
To give just one example: even the country's largest and most influential charity organization was shut down a few years ago — a move that effectively stripped society of an important civic capacity to sustain and repair itself independently of the state. Similar patterns can be seen in the treatment of teachers' union activists and other segments of civil society.
With the installation of the new Supreme Leader, even the already limited relationship between society and this institution has been further disrupted. Many Iranians have never seen him speak publicly or engage directly, and yet are now expected to accept him in this role. This alone signals a shift toward a new phase of authoritarianism, one in which very little space remains for civic actors to intervene.
D.F.
Regarding help and support in this critical phase, I would rather think of small steps. Many have lost their jobs, the majority are disconnected from the world, a situation which intensifies the economic pressure on a very large population — as mentioned above — and of course helps the state dominate its own narrative. The current statistics of unemployment is something between 2 to 4 million people.
On a small scale one could help with getting around the "class internet" even in a limited scale for as many as one could. Politically thought, one might try to connect the comrades and political activists, especially those having even lost their precarious jobs. This would be an act of solidarity trying to enable a base for any further political activities. It sounds very important to me to not patronise the absent voices. At the same time, it is important to resist against the binary mentioned before and staying close to the material concrete suffering of people in Iran.
B.R:
The Iranian state and the US/Israeli military-intervention lobby are, despite being enemies of each other, co-producers of the same trap: you are either with us or with them. This is not accidental. Both poles benefit from the binary, because it eliminates the political space where a genuine emancipatory alternative could breathe. This situation is a classic example of what we might call the hegemonic binary where dominant forces, precisely because they are dominant, have the power to define the terms of political debate. I would say either side of this binary is the problem, not the solution. Building a third voice inside this trap is extraordinarily difficult. You need enough organization to resist being absorbed or dismissed. To be heard at all, the third voice must work harder and speak more clearly than either side. The third voice is the only honest political position because it is the one that refuses to make the suffering of people into an instrument for either pole's power. That is precisely why it is so hard to build. And precisely why it matters.
N.S:
A third position would be to refuse both internal tyranny and foreign intervention, while recognizing that the path to liberation has no shortcuts. It is long and complex, and can only emerge through grounded, interconnected struggles across multiple communities—locally and regionally. Liberation is never achieved once and for all. At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that Iran's severe economic and repressive conditions have been significantly intensified by war. To insist that foreign intervention only worsens the situation must also go hand in hand with a message to comrades across the region and beyond: not to let imperialist war render Iranians' suffering and struggles invisible. Rather, the task is to remain with the complexity of the condition—to think and act through it, rather than reducing everything to a single "primary contradiction."
