The intensive violent atrocities done by the West and Israel against the people of West Asia have claimed our attention ever since the date that 'changed everything': October 7, 2023. On that day, Hamas, a Palestinian organization still faithful to the vision of liberated Palestine between the river and the sea, challenged both Israel (militarily) and the Palestinian Authority (ideologically).
However, the military battles in Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon turn out, the question will remain of the political future of the 14 million Palestinians worldwide: Will the fight for re-unification and Palestinian sovereignty ever succeed?
The Tough Question
For a bit over 100 years, many Palestinians have said they want a single state of Palestine with a diversity of ethnicities and religions. During the British Mandate from 1918 to 1948 this was the official position of the Palestinian leadership.
Then as now, there was some disagreement over the right to citizenship of recent European immigrants, but the idea of partitioning Palestine got no support at all, and it went without saying that Palestine would be a democracy with proportional representation of the various ethno-religious groups.
Specifically, they said, any Jew who was willing to live as a normal citizen without the privileges granted to Jews by the Mandatory would be welcome. As early as summer 1919 they went on record: "Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common."
In her article 'Liberation is not integration', (Mondoweiss, December 8, 2025), Lara Kilani asks, "How can Palestinians live with those who carried out the Gaza genocide?" She asks this good question while criticizing what she calls the "slogans" or "vague utterances" of supporters of One Democratic State (ODS). One of these "slogans" utters a basic tenet of democracy (the 'D' in 'ODS'), namely the equality of all citizens before the law. She then asks the paramount question: "Who makes up the 'all' in 'equal rights for all'?"
As a matter of fact, to my knowledge, no recent public vision of ODS has been vague in including in that 'all' every Palestinian (wherever they live, and including Arabic Jewish families resident in Palestine for centuries) and all current Israelis. For example, the first clause in the Munich Declaration envisions "one country that belongs to all its citizens including all those who currently live there and all those who were expelled over the past century and their descendants". One can disagree with this position, but it is not vague.
Kilani does disagree to some extent: She doubts the right to remain of "recent" or "freshly arrived" settlers from the West. In doing so she has opened a much-needed debate over the future status of the several million settler-colonial Israelis. Especially now, when Tel Aviv University's recent 'Peace Index' polls (inaccessible, mind you, for the last few months) tell us that roughly 80 percent of them are committing and supporting intensive genocide, living together has indeed become a 'big ask' for Palestinians.
The ODS visions I am referring to are found, since 2004, in entire books by Mazin Qumsiyeh, Virginia Tilley, Ali Abunimah and Ghada Karmi, and in the declarations and manifestos of the One Democratic State Initiative, the ODS Campaign, ODS in Palestine, the Stuttgart Declaration, the Dallas Declaration, the Boston Declaration on the One State, the two Haifa conferences, and the London/Madrid Declaration.
Possible Exceptions
For Lara Kilani, the exclusion of recent immigrants is "not punitive but necessary". The new arrivals do in fact fulfill neither of the traditional conditions for automatic citizenship – jus soli (being born in a place) or jus sanguinis (descent from a citizen), and the case for their exclusion is strengthened by the fact that they immigrated with the intent of supporting and expanding the racial-supremacist Israeli state.
But whatever the legalities, denying them automatic inclusion in the 'all' does not violate their basic human rights. As with the European immigrants forced upon the Palestinians by the British, the rights violation is that the indigenous owners did not have final say over who could immigrate.
There are several options for the political status of the settlers, until now only theoretically discussed in ODS circles. Detailed, practicable solutions have to wait until Palestinians have gained much more power and Israel has been forced to the negotiating table. As Alain Alameddine recently wrote in his answer to Kilani's article, "Of course, many details will be left to negotiations that precede (and shape) liberation…" But what principles can be outlined now?
To start with, Israelis convicted of war crimes, in any scenario, cannot claim automatic citizenship on ethical grounds; their acceptance by the polity would be contingent. For the rest – overwhelmingly Zionist, to varying degrees – a spectrum of views can be found in the century's worth of debate on the issue.
But a prominent formula is that those would be welcome who renounce Zionism, who agree to live as normal citizens in the state named Palestine. How to operationalize this? Would they have to sign a pledge showing their intent to support the normal, non-sectarian democracy? This seems fair, just as it seems legitimate for Palestinians, in any scenario, automatic citizens, to say loud and clear to those who refuse to give up their ethno-religious privileges, 'We don't want you. Please leave the country.' This honesty would be a big step towards de-colonization.
The extreme position, not discussed by Kilani and not proposed openly by anyone, foresees expelling all Israelis. This is however, not only immoral in punishing the 10 or 15% of Israelis who are already anti-Zionist, but has a below-zero chance in the world of international opinion. And a shift in that opinion, in favor of the positive ODS vision, is most likely necessary in order to end Western support for Israel. And it is this ostracism that would highly likely force Israel to surrender.
It can't be stressed strongly enough that, however many Israelis get welcomed to stay, or not welcomed, it would have nothing to do with their being Jewish. Just as it is a fact that Palestinians are not fighting Israelis because they are Jews but because they are colonialist robbers – as Mohammed El-Kurd explained in Mondoweiss in September 2023 – future citizenship criteria would judge them as colonizers who happen to be Jews. At any rate, sharing citizenship and homeland with brutal colonizers it is a generous compromise in anybody's book. Any ODS vision that accepts some or most of them is therefore a compromise, but perhaps one which gives up no Palestinian rights.
How Bitter is the Pill?
Kilani's questions show that the extremely open stance of ODS must be re-examined. Living with colonialist genocidaires is revolting, and the feelings of Palestinians over against their century-long tormentors are not to be argued with. There are, however, reasons why the rules of citizenship, and the corresponding number and type of former settlers included, might not matter crucially.
A look at what all ODS visions strictly entail in terms of majorities, economic power and emotional justice suggests that some ex-settler presence – over and above the Israelis who have for decades fought Zionism – might be less onerous than many Palestinians, including Lara Kilani, fear. First, by almost any measure, the single democratic country would be Palestinian, if only in the sense that a strong majority of the populace would be Palestinian.
Demographics: There are about 14 million Palestinians and 7 million Israeli Jews. Because ODS foresees both an end to the Israeli Law of Return and voting rights for all Palestinians, wherever they reside, these 21 million people would be sharing Palestinian citizenship. (The principle, by the way, of not setting a residency requirement for voting, is widely accepted: More than 140 countries practice it. Note, too, the clause in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence which says: "The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.") In short, together with the Israelis who are already anti-Zionist, a very comfortable anti-colonial, Palestinian majority is a certainty.
Return: Even if there were a residence requirement, Palestinians would still be in the majority. Already today they make up a slight majority of those living between the river and the sea. Add to this the Palestinians in exile who would really return – be they only two or three million – and the political power would lie firmly in Palestinian hands. And, of course, if anything distinguishes ODS visions, it is uncompromising insistence on the realization of the Right of Return. Recall that the first of the recent ODS conferences, held in Haifa in 2008 and 2010, were titled 'The Return of the Palestinian Refugees and the Democratic Secular State in Historic Palestine'.
Arabic-Palestinian identity: It is all but certain that this majority would immediately re-name streets, villages, towns, airports and anything else publicly visible. There would be no more 'Ben-Gurion' Airport, 'HaPalmach' Street in Al-Quds, or 'Nasholim' on the site of Tantura. Whether or not Hebrew would remain as an official language, at least in some provinces, Arabic would dominate the visual, educational and bureaucratic landscape – including banknotes and postage stamps, which would most likely honor Palestinians and Palestinian history.
Such quotidian de-Zionization would go some way, I believe, towards restoring feelings of political ownership of and belonging to Palestine. It also goes without saying that Palestine would be re-named 'Palestine'. The very term 'Israel', after all, is defined in terms of Jewishness.
Property restitution: The effect of restoring land and building ownership to Palestinians can hardly be overestimated and is also something all ODS visions insist on. Titles would newly be derived from the records of 1947, when approximately 95% of Palestine was owned by Palestinian individuals, families, cooperatives, companies, communities and waqfs. This also entails control over natural resources.
This alone would shift economic power away from the ex-settlers to the indigenous people. Consistent with international law and practice, if possession of property means anything, it means that evictions of post-1948 settlers would be possible. By the same reasoning the assets of the Israeli state and the industries and businesses which directly enabled the Israeli colony to function would be confiscated in whole.
Compensation: Exact sums owed to Palestinians do not have to be computed already now – although several plausible computations do exist, convertible to today's currencies. But the principle is unbendable that for real estate, goods and infrastructure, missed income, etc., the Israeli state and their Western supporters – have a huge debt. Ethically as well as in international law (for instance in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948), the right to compensation is uncontested. Moreover, social and psychological damages due to robbery, displacement and humiliation must be included. A special fund would, as well, 'compensate' for those murdered by Israel.
Nevertheless, let's do some rough maths: Assuming on average 3 million Palestinian refugees per year during the last 78 years, we have 234 million refugee years. If damages are set at a mere $20,000 per year per Palestinian returnee, the bill amounts to $4.68 trillion or several hundred thousand dollars per Palestinian – a major shift in economic power. Compensation is due, as well, to Palestinians who remained in both 1948-occupied and 1967-occupied Palestine.
The Socio-economic System: No ODS vision, to my knowledge, takes a detailed stand on the mixture of socialism and capitalism in the new state. Like everywhere else, such questions would be fought out day-to-day democratically. Thus there seems to be no reason to fear, as does Lara Kilani, "liberal modes of colonization embedded in one-state proposals". The amount of 'liberalism' would be determined by… the Palestinians.
It would actually be helpful to know which one-state proposals Kilani regards as continuing to have "power asymmetries, institutional racism, and demographic anxieties". She fears that "Bethlehem under a single state would not simply gain Jewish residents; it would be subjected to the same forces of settlement, capital, and demographic engineering that have transformed every inch of land Israel has controlled." But the Palestinians themselves, by virtue of their restored economic power and political majority, would have the power to prevent such socio-economic and demographic outcomes. This is a key fact about an ODS future.
Integration: Kilani makes the crucial point that "liberation is not integration". Showing some sympathy for the two-state solution, she writes: "Separation offers something integration cannot: sovereignty, self-determination, and distance from those who have participated in or were indifferent to ethnic cleansing." Especially since most ODS visions do not explicitly plead for integration, ODS would agree. But given the strong Palestinian position envisioned thus far, this "something" could also be had without "separation" – moreover for all Palestinians.
Unlike bi-nationalism, which is mentioned in passing by Kilani, ODS at the very least has no goal whatsoever of integrating two 'nations' or 'national groups' – because it gives 'nations' no constitutional standing at all. (Mondoweiss ran articles in May, June and August 2018 on bi-nationalism as opposed to ODS, as well as two articles this winter in response to Kilani's, by Rima Najjar and Sara Kershnar.)
But concerning integration among the people of the two groups, I believe there is a misunderstanding. For to my knowledge, ODS visions nowhere declare that such integration – called perhaps 'reconciliation' or even 'harmony' – is a precondition for the democratic state. To be sure, some ODS advocates have painted a picture of forgiveness and togetherness which ought to come about. And who can object to that?
But it is not a core ODS principle or even aim. Put rather crudely, the new state can get by quite well if most people feel 'Hate me, just don't hurt me'. Whatever 'integration' occurs would be a private matter. The ODS aims are for the returnees to vote and return, for land to belong to its rightful owners, for reclamation of tangible Arabic-Palestinian culture and for ethno-religious privilege to become a thing of the past. These are the core. As for integration, let the chips fall where they may.
Conclusion
On this view, the 'bare bones' of ODS ideology mean de-colonization. They entail One Palestinian State – OPS, if you will. The re-Palestinization of Palestine foreseen by ODS is both political, due to a de-Zionized constitution, and practical, in terms of majorities, land titles, and economic redistribution.
Despite this, Lara Kilani writes that "One-state proposals that fail to address land return, settler removal, and the redistribution of power risk becoming the new 'Oslo peace process' with different branding." Again: to my knowledge, all ODS visions do address exactly these things! She also frames several more specific questions, which ODS likewise answers: "Do Israelis have collective rights?" No. "Do Palestinians have collective rights?" No. (They have iron-clad individual rights, and would be the majority.) "Who controls the military?" The Palestinian majority. "What is the economic arrangement of the state?" To be determined by the majority. "Do Israelis have to return more than a hundred years of looted wealth, land, and resources?" Yes. "To whom?" To the Palestinians.
She also writes that "Allowing settlers to remain unchallenged preserves the very power asymmetries that decolonization seeks to dismantle." But as we have seen, in the ODS vision the settlers are challenged at every turn. While the exact aesthetics and economics of restored Palestine cannot and should not be spelled out by ODS, the new Palestinian majority would have the power to dismantle every last settler privilege.
Nonetheless, the tricky issue raised by Kilani remains: Under what conditions could citizenship be bestowed upon those who heretofore carried out the dispossession, ethnic cleansing, humiliation, and genocide of the rightful owners of Palestine? As Kilani says, living with them is in many ways an unacceptable presumption. But if we consider only today's Israeli children (none of us, after all, can help where we were born), we see that there are perhaps some purely humanitarian criteria for including – tolerating – some number of ex-settlers.
A Palestinian activist friend living in the West Bank told me recently that he can deal with the fact that some, or even many, settlers would remain. He said, in effect, "Bring it on." Similarly, PLO thinker Mohammad Rasheed in his 1970 booklet Towards a Democratic State in Palestine wrote, "As paradoxical as it may seem, people who fight can afford to be more tolerant." Others, justifiably, take a harder line – and only Palestinians have a right to take any line at all on this tough citizenship issue.
At minimum, just because the One Democratic State vision needs more fleshing out – a detailed draft of a constitution is indeed sorely needed – let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. The more so as we know that objectively, the main alternative to ODS, namely the two-state solution, cannot do what ODS does, namely, fulfill all the rights of all the Palestinians.
